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Background for the European Defense Community

Author(s): Clarence C. Walton

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BACKGROUND FOR THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY

THE signing in Paris, on May 27, 1952, of the treaty creating the European Defense Community may very well prove the historical watershed of our parlous period. Not since the days of Pope Urban II in 1095 has Europe seen a truly international army. With the advent of the EDC, therefore, new and "significant initials"—to purloin the editorial descriptives of an American daily—have come into being, but whether the EDC ever becomes, in a genuinely constructive sense, the alphabetical combination which spells out a firm security formula for Europe remains locked in mystery.¹ The immediacy and violence of the chain reactions it has sparked in every major world capital are sufficiently indicative of the revolutionary character of this new military-diplomatic creation. Against the inability to frame definitive assessments must be posed the imperative for more detailed and coördinated information concerning the origins and proposed structure of a European army; this exploratory study is obviously intended to achieve the latter objective.

Developments leading to the actual signing of the draft treaty fall into four more or less distinct phases: (1) the projection of the idea for a European army at the Strasbourg Assembly in August of 1950; (2) the official endorsement of the concept by the French government in October of the same year through the Pleven Plan; (3) the completion of the Interim Report in July 1951 by experts from the participating states; and (4) the conference of the Foreign Ministers at Strasbourg in December which effectively hurdled important questions of principle and prepared the way for full acceptance of German participation in the European defenses by the NATO Conference at Lisbon in February 1952.

¹ Said of the draft treaty signed May 9, *New York Herald Tribune*, May 12, 1952.

I. European Security in the Post-war Setting

If a formula of blood and iron made Bismarck the prophet of our gloomy century, the transmutation of that dictum into the purely human terms of "blood, sweat and tears" marks Winston Churchill as the fulfillment of the prophecy. What G. Lowes Dickinson had earlier called the "international anarchy"² has run its logical gambit and the bitter fruits implicit in the Churchillian recipe have become the daily bread of mankind the world over. Europe emerged from the last war with three hallmarks which, in the aggregate, were wholly unprecedented in her history: (1) she no longer had a first-class Power; (2) she was cruelly partitioned; (3) and she lived uneasily within boundaries drawn exclusively for military and tactical purposes. Lacking a major Power, Europe found herself perched uneasily between two colossi whose ways of life and whose behavior in international society were viewed traditionally with a certain degree of suspicion. In this new bipolar world only Russia and the United States had the oil, the iron and the manpower with which to build modern fighting machines.³ In the second place statesmen had to deal with an "iron-curtained" Europe and it was frequently argued that this partitioning had doomed her civilization and vitality beyond recall—that the continent was dead and there was no point in not mercifully interring the corpse. From the immediate view the most important feature of all was the sketching of European frontiers on a purely military atlas. As Dr. Michael Freund, the co-editor of *Gegenwart*, has pointed out,

² *The International Anarchy, 1904-1911* (London, 1926).

³ Instructive data on the material resources of the two Great Powers were given as early as 1946 in the *Minerals Yearbook*, especially pp. 622 *et seq.* On population figures see the prognostications made by Frank Notestein, *The Future Population of Europe and the Soviet Union* (Geneva, 1944), esp. pp. 312 *et seq.*, and the later studies by Dudley Kirk, *Europe's Population in the Interim Years* (Geneva, 1946), and Frank Lorimer, *New Compass of the World* (New York, 1949). Another writer holds that the "age and sex structure of the current [Russian] population points to a forthcoming period when the supply of human effectives will be favorable for Russian aggression." Eugene M. Kulischer, "Russian Manpower", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 31, p. 67 (October 1952). For a contrary view consult Kathleen Thayer, "The Myth of Eastern Manpower", *The Yale Review*, vol. 40, pp. 614-620 (June 1951).

the present condition of the world is not one of peace; it is one that is a direct product of war. It is a state of affairs based simply on the war maps of 1945. The result of the last war was to leave the victorious armies standing where they were at the time of the cease-fire. The Soviet sphere of interest corresponds exactly with the areas that the Red Army over-ran. Never before in modern history has this happened: that the frontiers of peace should be drawn precisely along the lines reached by the conquering armies.⁴

It was on the continent that the armies of the two colossi had their points of immediate physical contact and the necessity for accurate assessment of Soviet designs became paramount. Did Communist ideology imply an inevitable armed clash with the West?⁵ Was Colonel G. A. Tokaev, the former Soviet Army officer, to be believed when he warned and titled his recent book *Stalin Means War?*⁶ Was Stalin sincere when he spoke of peaceful coexistence between East and West?⁷ Or was coexistence a mesmerizing verbalism designed to lull the West into fatal slumber? Finally, would the Western pledge to build its

⁴ "The World Order Has Collapsed", in J. G. Smyth (ed.), *The Western Defences* (London, 1951), p. 100.

⁵ An affirmative answer to this question is implicit in the work of James Burnham, *The Coming Defeat of Communism* (New York, 1950). Cf. Lev E. Dobriansky, "America's East European Policy", *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, vol. 4, pp. 253-262 (Summer 1948). Under Waldemar Gurian's direction the *Review of Politics* has given extensive coverage to questions of Marxist philosophy. One should not neglect Barbara Ward's classic exposition in her *Policy for the West* (New York, 1951) especially chs. 1 and 2, nor Hans Morgenthau's solemn warning not to underestimate Soviet strength, "The Conquest of the United States by Germany", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist*, vol. 6, pp. 21-26 (1950). For all facets of Soviet conduct see the series of excellent publications issued by the Russian Institutes of Columbia University (listed in *Reports on Research and Publications*, New York, 1950, 1951) and Harvard University.

⁶ *Stalin Means War* (London, 1952).

⁷ In statements to members of the Soviet Communist party Stalin had declared that the mere existence of capitalistic Powers should be regarded as a threat against Russia. Quoted from *Bolshevik*, organ of the Politburo, by *The Times* of London, August 2, 1950. In the same Soviet magazine Molotov in December of 1949, and Mikoyan, in *Pravda*, March 11, 1950, spoke of the inevitability of world conflict. On this specific point see the able summations by Raymond L. Garthoff, "The Concept of the Balance of Power in Soviet Policy", *World Politics*, vol. 4, pp. 85-111, and Peter Meyer, "The Driving Force Behind Soviet Imperialism", *Commentary*, vol. 13, pp. 209-217 (March 1952).

armed strength arouse the latent "fear complex" of Soviet leaders and "persuade them of the necessity of a desperate gamble for survival"; or was it more probable "that they would seek means of accommodation to permit peaceful co-existence until the inexorable laws of Marxism . . . swing the balance more clearly in their favor"?⁸

Whatever doubts had assailed Western leaders in their estimates of Russian intentions were swept away by Korea which set warning lights pulsating in all Western chancelleries. Korea revealed beyond peradventure that the Soviet Union was the great missionary Power which would continue to "attack all alternatives to their Communist system so long as its rulers consider that it is to their interest to do so, and so long as the advantages of the Communist group of nations in military strength, political zeal and centralized control can be maintained."⁹ For Russia the door to the future was marked "push" and no one could maintain that war, used directly or indirectly, had been abandoned by her as an instrument of national policy.¹⁰ Almost overnight the political climate of Europe appeared to change. The old alchemy of fear and indecision gave way to a sense of urgency and determination and although the new vision was often confused in method and illogical in content the recognition was clear and unmistakable that something had to be done, and quickly, to build Europe's ramparts. It was in an atmosphere electric with tension that delegates to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe convened at Strasbourg during August 1950.

⁸ Rupert Emerson and Inis L. Claude, Jr., "The Soviet Union and the United Nations: An Essay in Interpretation", *International Organization*, vol. 6, pp. 1-26 (February 1952). These authors doubt that Russia would risk war under the present circumstances. That her leaders still have a "fear complex" against the West is one of the conclusions reached by Margaret Mead, *Soviet Attitudes Toward Authority* (New York and Toronto, 1951). Cf. Philip E. Mosely, "Soviet-American Relations since the War", *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 263, pp. 202-211 (May 1949).

⁹ Report of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Defence in the Cold War: The Task of the Free World* (New York, 1950), p. 13.

¹⁰ Quincy Wright, "The Nature of Conflict", *The Western Political Quarterly*, vol. 4, pp. 139-209 (June 1951). For an exhaustive treatment of the subject see his two-volume analysis, *A Study of War* (Chicago, 1942).

II. *The Strasbourg Recommendations*

At Strasbourg on August 11, 1950 the idea for a European army was conceived in the Consultative Assembly. Article 1 of the statute placed defense matters beyond the purview of the Council but the statutory dike broke with news of the flooding of North Korean troops across the thirty-eighth parallel.¹¹ In a paroxysm of leadership which it later repented the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe sent a message to the Consultative Assembly the final paragraphs of which ran as follows:

Serious though the international situation may be today, it is nevertheless a good omen that, thanks to the participation in your work of new members,¹² Europe is able to make a greater contribution than before to the cause it seeks to defend.

As stated in the Preamble of the Statute, our main concern is the pursuit of peace based upon justice and international co-operation. The Committee of Ministers, meeting a few weeks after the violation of international law by Northern Korea, is anxious to restate this vital principle.

The Committee suggests that the Assembly should in its turn express its devotion to the cause of peace by affirming even more categorically, in accordance with a vital provision of the Statute, its complete solidarity with the action of the Security Council of the United Nations for the defence of peace-loving peoples against aggression. . . .¹³

A British Laborite, Maurice Edelman, complained tartly that in a moment of crisis "one might have hoped that the message of the Committee of Ministers would have been a rallying cry;

¹¹ The whole logic of events ran against the prohibition on the Council of Europe to discuss defense. At one of the opening sessions Mr. Crawley, a British Labor delegate to Strasbourg, declared that the most compelling reasons for European unity were defense and economics and that of these "defence came first." *Consultative Assembly, Official Reports of Debates, 1949* (Strasbourg, 1949), pp. 199-200. Cited henceforth as *C. A. Reports*. The collection of *Documents and Working Papers* will be abbreviated to read, *Docs. and W. P.*.

¹² As a step toward the implementation of the "Petersberg Protocol" (November 24, 1949), Germany had just been admitted to the Council of Europe but only as an associate member. This restricted membership hurt German pride and the sting of the "insult" was sharpened by the simultaneous admission of the Saar under the same conditions.

¹³ *Docs. and W. P.*, 1950, Doc. 9.

it might have been a trumpet blast to Europe summoning the nations to rally their forces, but instead of a trumpet blast we have had something that sounds much more like a toot on a penny whistle.”¹⁴ Nevertheless, within three days the “toot on the penny whistle” crescendoed into a thunderous blast which shocked the startled delegates into overwhelming approval of the Churchill resolution. From the very beginning British Labor proved a determined foe of the European army project and it was, therefore, somewhat of a cruel irony that the opening of debate on the ministerial message fell to a Labor member, James Callaghan. He declared that the Consultative Assembly must support the United Nations action in Korea “with all the forces at our command” as a clear demonstration that “we are fully determined to resist aggression from whatever quarter it may come.”¹⁵ The importance of Mr. Callaghan’s observation was not so much its substance but the fact that it served as a convenient precedent for those who nurtured more ambitious schemes. Later when Labor sought to hang the European army project on the technical gibbet of statutory prohibition it found itself speaking to a highly skeptical audience at Strasbourg.

The first eloquent pleas for a European army as such came from members of the French delegation. The prominent Socialist, André Philip, insisted that Europe’s safety could no longer be assured by outdated national armies organized on outdated lines:

The problem . . . is no longer that of juxtaposing all the national armies . . . but of creating a European army financed by a European fund fed by European taxes. Only insofar as we show ourselves capable of setting up this organization . . . will we succeed.

And I believe, at the same time, that this is the only way to resolve a problem of which there is much talk, the problem of Germany’s participation in this defence organization. . . . We cannot favour the re-establishment of a German army. . . . But once a European army is set up it would be an army responsible

¹⁴ C. A. *Reports*, 1950, p. 38. For a full statement of his position against a European army see Edelman’s essay, “Europe’s Place in Western Defences”, Smyth (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 119-133.

¹⁵ C. A. *Reports*, 1950, p. 32.

for defending the whole territory of Europe, with all the citizens of Europe. There would be no more problems of a national character. . .¹⁶

French views were crystallized in two motions tabled on August 10 by François de Menthon and Paul Reynaud. The first called for the creation of a European High Commissioner for Defense who would be responsible to the Council of Europe and who would have duties similar to national ministers of defense.¹⁷ Reynaud's motion was more comprehensive in that it asked for the "immediate creation, among the free peoples of Europe, of an effective European Authority having at its disposal a single European Army subject to European democratic control, co-operating with the United States and Canada."¹⁸ By exhorting countries to surrender a portion of their sovereignty to a higher and more effective organ¹⁹ he focused attention on the British delegation whose zealous care for the preservation of an unsullied national sovereignty was well known.

The clue to England's reaction came in the significant omission of any British signatures from either of the French proposals; indeed the only English move was the tabling of a rather innocuous Conservative motion by Duncan Sandys.²⁰ When Chairman Spaak gaveled the Assembly to order at 10:40 on August 11 the delegates had before them three resolutions designed to answer the Ministers' request for Assembly support of the "defence of peace-loving peoples against aggression." A night's reflection had brought a remarkable cohesion to British ranks and Lord Layton of the Liberal party warned that neither Conservatives nor Laborities would or could agree to any defense scheme which required federation.²¹ More vehement was Norway's Finn Moe who blazed the trail for what became a solid Scandinavian, Irish and British Labor opposition to the French suggestions. Mr. Moe marveled that the French could

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 38-40. ¹⁷ *Docs. and W. P.*, 1950, Doc. 37. ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Doc. 42.

¹⁹ C. A. *Reports*, 1950, pp. 118-122. For summaries of his views on European needs for unity see his articles, "Pour la défense de l'Europe", *La Revue de Paris*, pp. 5-9 (January 1952), and "The Unifying Force in Europe", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 28, pp. 255-264 (January 1950).

²⁰ *Docs. and W. P.*, 1950, Doc. 36.

²¹ C. A. *Reports*, 1950, p. 210.

ignore the United Nations, the British Commonwealth and especially the Atlantic Community

which, from an economic, financial and military point of view is much more vital than European unity can ever be. . . . Is the idea behind all this talk about European defence and a European Army the creation of the famous Third Force which might be independent in the world-wide struggle between democracy and totalitarianism. . . ? We should take care that European unity does not lead to European isolation.²²

The Assembly had scarcely caught its breath from this chill blast when Winston Churchill arose to address the body. Puffing tranquilly on the omnipresent cigar, Churchill uncoiled an oratorical smoke ring which spelled out dramatic support for the projected European army. He was careful to note that "nearly all the speakers who have addressed us, including our two British Socialist colleagues, have trespassed on this hitherto forbidden territory, and its effective occupation by the Assembly has now become a *fait accompli*."²³ Then came the broadsides in rapid sequence. Would European rearmament serve as a pretext for a preventive war by Russia? Emphatically not since the Soviets have their own calculated designs which will be neither timed nor deflected by events of this sort. How much has been done since the Brussels Pact to offset the terrible 6 to 1 odds in manpower? Practically nothing!²⁴ Would the West's immense superiority in oil, steel, aluminum and other materials deter aggression? On the contrary, they might become the tempting prizes which invite attack. Has Europe time to put her defenses in order? Here, for the first and only time, Mr. Churchill dropped his categorical negatives to declare that "no one can answer that question for certain" but the Ameri-

²² *Ibid.*, p. 220.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 224.

²⁴ The structural weaknesses in both the Brussels Pact and NATO were sources of grave concern. For a brief analysis see Colonel Herman Beukema, "The Military Organization of the Free World", *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science*, vol. 24, pp. 150-160 (January 1951). The legal aspects of NATO have aroused considerable interest among international lawyers. See Sir Eric Beckett, *The North Atlantic Treaty, The Brussels Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations* (London, 1950), and Joseph Nisot, "Le Traité de l'Atlantique-Nord et la Charte des Nations Unies", *Revue de Droit International et de Droit Comparé* (Institut Belge de Droit Comparé), Nos. 3-4, pp. 145-165 (1951).

can monopoly of the A-bomb may "constitute an effective deterrent against Soviet aggression, at least until they have . . . built up an adequate supply of atomic bombs of their own."²⁵ What, then, must be done? Europe must take the calculated risk to rearm; and although the Consultative Assembly had no power to act itself or to relieve governments of their duties it did have the power to make a gesture of "practical and constructive guidance" by giving approval to the resolution he was about to introduce:

The Assembly, in order to express its devotion to the maintenance of peace and its resolve to sustain the action of the Security Council of the United Nations in defence of peaceful peoples against aggression, calls for the immediate creation of a unified European Army subject to proper European democratic control and acting in full co-operation with the United States and Canada.²⁶

Stressing a duality of needs Churchill, first, had called for immediate action to build up Europe's strength as a means of bolstering the bargaining position of the West *vis à vis* Russia; and, secondly, he had insisted on the necessity for close coöperation between this European army and the North American partners. Beyond these items was room for stratospheric deductions and fuzzy debate. Particularly vague was that judiciously considered imprecision—"subject to proper democratic control". The head of the Labor delegation, Hugh Dalton, pounced on this ambiguous phrase²⁷ and called for additional time to study the issue. Despite the plea the motion was jostled off to a "Committee of Twenty" which in less than an hour returned it to the Assembly with a revision which placed the "European Army subject to proper democratic control *under the authority of a European Minister of Defence.*"²⁸ Churchill assented to the nine-word addition and the motion swept to a

²⁵ C. A. Reports, 1950, p. 226.

²⁶ Docs. and W. P., 1950, Doc. 47. See also C. A. Reports, 1950, p. 228.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 262. Glenvil Hall, who succeeded Dalton as chairman of the British Labor delegation, complained that "none of us has had an opportunity of examining it thoroughly or discovering its implications" (p. 302).

²⁸ Italics indicate the Committee's insertion.

resounding victory by a vote of 89 to 5 with 27 abstentions.²⁹ The bulk of abstentions came from Scandinavian, German and British Socialists. The unmistakably clear stand of the British and Scandinavians had no counterpart among the German Socialists. Carlo Schmid, in a rather vague way, said that the German Social Democrats supported the motion in principle but felt that "since the present legal and political status of the German Federal Republic prevents us from making a real contribution within the framework of the motion . . . we feel it is best for us to abstain from voting."³⁰

Aside from an ambiguity which the amendment failed to dispel, the one remarkable feature of the whole proceedings was the fact that the revised Churchill resolution was virtually the twin of Reynaud's motion which had been conveniently withdrawn by its sponsor when the British leader entered the picture. Somehow or other the federal band wagon which Reynaud, Philip and De Menthon so laboriously had been pulling was now hitched to the stronger and more colorful British work horse. That Churchill had been outmaneuvered by the French bloc intent on using the European army scheme as a wedge for federation seems a reasonable conjecture,³¹ and this surmise is strengthened by an examination of subsequent developments. On the 18th Philip told the Assembly at Strasbourg that it "must realize the implications of what is being done"³² and Reynaud took it out of the realm of implication by specifically demanding the creation of European Ministers for each of the major sections of European life, including defense. Had the

²⁹ C. A. *Reports*, 1950, p. 310. See *Docs. and W. P.*, 1950, Doc. 52, for the complete text of the revised and approved motion.

³⁰ C. A. *Reports*, 1950, p. 300. For an amplification of Schmid's views see his article, "Die Aussenpolitik des Machtlosen", *Aussen Politik*, pp. 11-19 (January 1952). Speaking for the Adenauer government Herr von Brentano pledged Christian Democratic support for the resolutions, *C. A. Reports*, 1950, p. 298.

³¹ This was the author's impression after having talked to some officials of the Council of Europe at Strasbourg in November 1951.

³² C. A. *Reports*, 1950, p. 728. It was apparent that these French delegates recognized that the German military danger was less pressing than the political danger and that the only solution was to include Germany within a federated Europe. This reasoning was developed by Michel Mouskhely and Gaston Stefani, *L'Europe face au fédéralisme* (Strasbourg and Paris, 1949), esp. pp. 61-65.

Reynaud-Philip approach won Assembly support it would have led, according to Stefano Jacini of Italy, to the achievement of the "most substantial and most durable part of European federation. . . ." ³³ Churchill's motion was manna for federalists' banqueting and it is no surprise that they gave it a resounding post-prandial belch of approval.

On the other hand, Churchill himself viewed his approach not as a wedge toward federalism but as a lever to pry open American commitments for Europe by demonstrating Europe's readiness to help itself. Speaking to the House of Commons a month after his tour de force at Strasbourg, Churchill called for sixty to seventy divisions for the European army but the really significant part of the speech was his request for an American contribution which would amount roughly to 20 per cent of the total forces.³⁴ Clearly even in its composition the European army was quite a mongrel.

Still unanswered were important questions of structure. How would the European Defense Minister be selected and by whom? What powers would he have? What should be the liaison between the European army and the North Atlantic forces? How should German contingents be integrated into the force? That these problems remained unsolved was the fault of neither Churchill nor the Consultative Assembly: all that could be done in that body was to "toot the penny whistle" in the hope that actual implementation and execution would be undertaken by the respective governments.

III. *The Pleven Plan*

Events moved rapidly, hurried onward by the changing fortunes of war in far-off Korea. Washington pressed for effective action to bring Germany into the defense forces of the West. As a step in that direction the three Foreign Ministers of France, England and the United States announced on September 19, 1950 their approval for fitting German units into an integrated European force and declared their readiness to revise the Oc-

³³ C. A. *Reports*, 1950, pp. 738-740.

³⁴ House of Commons, *Debates*, vol. 478, cc. 1389-1390. Germany, Italy and the United States would contribute ten divisions, France twenty, Benelux three, and perhaps three more from England.

cipation Statute. The following day the North Atlantic Council announced a five-point plan which would allot Germany an essential rôle in the Western security system. Coincident with these developments was the alarming comportment of certain German industrialists who, confident that Western rearmament meant an end to both demilitarization and decartelization, began stalling tactics with the Schuman Plan. For the West to encourage and abet German rearment without surrounding it with proper safeguards caused a wave of apprehension among the nations which had fallen victim to German aggression. As the keystone in the defense arc France felt a particularly heavy responsibility and observers wondered if she were equal to the gigantic task; neutralism, *incivism*, communism and party strife were sapping her creative energies. No encouraging developments had appeared to alter the gloomy estimate of *The Economist* (London) which on November 24, 1949 had expressed alarm that France had undertaken rearment in a "mood of polite despair".

Time began to press heavily and just when it appeared that France would succumb to a stupor of indecision she exhibited that traditional and amazing Gallic quality *se débrouiller* (to get out of a fix).³⁵ Her dramatic answer came on October 24, 1950 when René Pleven³⁶ presented the government's program to the French National Assembly. A rather brutal dissection of the Premier's stylized pronouncement reveals the French position essentially in these terms:³⁷

1. France admitted the necessity of German participation in Western defenses.

³⁵ The term is borrowed, with gratitude, from Donald C. McKay's admirable study, *The United States and France* (Cambridge, Mass., 1951), p. 42.

³⁶ Perhaps it was appropriate that the EDC should receive official support through Pleven. His father had been director of military studies at Saint-Cyr; he himself had ridden into prominence as a De Gaullist although he broke with the General in January 1946 over the issue of credits and constitutional reforms.

³⁷ The discourse is printed in full in *Chronique de politique étrangère*, vol. 5, pp. 588-591 (September-November 1952). See the following: Louis Koeltz, "L'armée européenne", *La Revue de Paris*, pp. 30-40 (February 1952); "The European Army", *Round Table*, No. 165, pp. 37-43 (December 1951); and H. G. L., "The European Defence Community", *The World Today*, vol. 8, pp. 236-248 (June 1952).

2. The German contribution could be made only in a European army which represented a "complete fusion of the material and human elements". For this reason, integration must be on the lowest possible level.
3. The European army must be indissolubly linked to a European political authority which would exercise the necessary democratic controls.
4. Executive work would be entrusted primarily to a European Minister of Defense who would determine the contributions in men, equipment and materials from each country. He would be assisted by a Council of Defense.
5. The army would be financed through a common budget.
6. In regard to both strategy and organizational requirements the European army would be used in accordance with obligations assumed under the Atlantic Pact.
7. Each country would retain control of that part of its existing army which was not incorporated in the common force (overseas and police units) although the European Defense Minister could, for a particular task, release part of the pooled national army at the request of the participating countries.

No attempt was made by M. Pleven to conceal his indebtedness to the Strasbourg Recommendation and the comment his proposal evoked followed the main lines of the Strasbourg pattern. The National Assembly received the Plan with mixed feelings but only the Communists and the De Gaullists came out flatly against it.³⁸ Outside France Count Sforza warmly welcomed the suggestion but Dr. Adenauer demanded full equality for Germany as the condition "without which we shall in no circumstances co-operate".³⁹ Washington blew hot and cold. Secretary of State Acheson first welcomed the Pleven Plan as a means of lessening differences between the United States and France⁴⁰ but on second thought recognized that acceptance of

³⁸ The vote was 343 in favor and 225 opposed. *Le Monde*, October 27, 1950. See also Leo Hamon, "Warum Frankreich misstrauisch ist", *Aussen Politik*, pp. 216-220 (April 1952).

³⁹ Count Sforza expressed his views in a speech to the influential Milan Institute for International Studies on October 28, 1950. *The Times* of London on October 30, 1950 quoted Adenauer to this effect: "If we trust France we expect France to trust us"—a statement which conveniently ignores much past history. Cf. R. Lauret, "Frankreich und die deutschen Waffen", *Aussen Politik*, pp. 23-27 (January 1951).

⁴⁰ *The Times* of London, October 26, 1950.

the French proposal meant an indefinite postponement in building the effective fighting force that America felt was necessary.⁴¹ By the time Jules Moch, the Defense Minister of France, had finished explaining the Pleven Plan to the NATO Council it was evident that Washington's second thoughts more accurately mirrored American official policy; the communiqué issued by the Defense Ministers, "every word of which was laboriously polished to reflect the dazzling promise of eventual agreement and to distract the eye from the dark shadow of present disagreement", had not the faintest rustle of approaching compromise.⁴²

In one sense Britain's attitude was even more important to France. If the United Kingdom could be persuaded to co-operate in the venture the chances of softening American opposition were excellent. However, Strasbourg had been an object lesson which France could scarcely forget. That there was basis for French fears of *scepticisme à Londres* found ready witness in the *Daily Herald* which, reflecting Labor opinion, commented that M. Pleven had obviously projected his schemes "without any great hope of seeing them accepted."⁴³ The first hint to England's official policy toward the Pleven Plan came during the speech from the throne on October 31, 1950 when the government pledged full support toward building Europe's defenses within the Brussels Pact and NATO.⁴⁴ Nothing was said of a European army and when Mr. Churchill injected the issue by identifying the Atlantic force with a European army he was rebuked by Prime Minister Attlee for "departing from

⁴¹ See the editorial in the *New York Herald Tribune*, October 26, 1950, which first developed this argument. One of the ablest counterarguments which called on the United States to reverse its initial hostility toward the Pleven Plan was written by two former ECA officials, Theodore Geiger and H. van Cleveland, *Making Western Europe Defensible: An Appraisal of the Effectiveness of the United States Policy in Western Europe* (Washington, 1951).

⁴² *The Times* of London, November 3, 1950. Moch had told his associates: "I have come here to recommend strongly the adoption of the Pleven Plan *and only for that.*" Italics mine. *Le Soir*, October 28, 1950.

⁴³ October 26, 1950. On the same day *The Times* had editorially hailed the Pleven Plan as a "genuine attempt at compromise" but cautioned that the federalist principles latent in the scheme presented formidable obstacles to its acceptance by any British government.

⁴⁴ House of Commons, *Debates*, vol. 480, cc. 6-7.

his usual accuracy of language". The question which Mr. Attlee dodged by omission he now evaded by a plea for more time to study the proposal.⁴⁵

The fall meeting of the Strasbourg Assembly was scheduled to convene on November 18. Since it afforded Churchill an international forum from which to castigate the government's "do-nothing" policy Labor was forced to speed its study. On November 13, Ernest Davies, Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, told the House of Commons that it was the government's belief that defense matters were and should be barred by statute from the Council of Europe, and that the government was "unable to accept the proposals put forward for a European Army and a European Minister of Defence" since NATO already covered the field and the European army plan would only result in "duplication, confusion and divided responsibility."⁴⁶ The Conservative position at this time was scarcely one of luminous clarity but the debates did reveal their stand in terms no more accommodating than Labor's to any supranational army scheme.

Consistency was not one of the hallmarks of the diplomatic negotiations that went on during this phase. Meeting in Rome on November 5 the Committee of Ministers seemed to accept the logic of the British position and in its message to the Consultative Assembly warned that "decisions on matters of national defence do not fall within the scope of the Council of Europe"; yet in presenting the ministerial message Count Sforza watered down the prohibition considerably and the Assembly ignored it completely.⁴⁷ The ensuing debates revealed

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, cc. 17, 33.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, cc. 1399, 1407.

⁴⁷ *Docs. and W. P.*, 1950, Doc. 136. The Ministers expressed the hope that "problems of the defense of free Europe may be satisfactorily dealt with in the near future by decision of the Governments and the competent international organisations." The message was clear enough but Count Sforza observed that it was not "this or that article of the Statute, on that occasion, which governed our decision. It was only a question of political calculation. However, it is quite possible that you will have a future opportunity to resume the fruitful discussions of last summer. . ." *C. A. Reports*, 1950, p. 1284. If the Ministers had slammed shut the door Count Sforza clearly intimated that it was not locked, and while he apparently made no distinction between the words "decisions" and "discussions", Maurice Schumann did so in an attempt to show that the Assembly could always discuss matters of defense.

a violent undercurrent of bitterness between the French and German views particularly in regard to the question of equality for all members of the proposed association.

Perhaps the most constructive contribution at Strasbourg was the important statement made to the Assembly on November 24 by the French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman. He clearly pointed up the differences between the Americans who seemed to want "direct participation of autonomous German military units in Atlantic defences" and the French who followed the lines of approach marked out by the Assembly. He denied categorically that the French government had any plan for the political structure of Europe, declaring that "we shall have to think about this later." Finally, he gave expression to a curious logic when he insisted that the Strasbourg-Pleven Plans did not involve rearming Germany:

To rearm a country means to make freely available to it—and to its Government—a national armed force capable of becoming the instrument of its policy. It is not arming a country to include it in a joint defence scheme, organized and directed by the whole body of participating countries which exercise collective authority over all aspects and stages of this organization.⁴⁸

By divorcing the army plan from political federation, Schuman drove a sharp wedge into British opinion which, up to this point, had maintained a fairly solid opposition. Ernest Bevin continued to find Europe's salvation only in the framework of the Atlantic Community but⁴⁹ Anthony Eden now saw no incompatibility between the two concepts.⁵⁰ The sincerity of both men underscored the confusion which still shrouded the

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 1688-1690. For an amplification of Schuman's views see *Le Monde*, February 17, 1951.

⁴⁹ House of Commons, *Debates*, vol. 481, c. 1172.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, c. 1183. Eden saw the European army as a "permanent" force in contradistinction to the Atlantic grouping which was "temporary". His logic carried weight, for the next day Ernest Davies declared that the "Government did not rule out altogether the possibility of a European Army being fitted into the pattern of the Atlantic defences provided that there was no delay in building up Western defences and no danger of weakening the security of the Atlantic Powers." *Ibid.*, c. 1333. Davies' statement represents a substantial modification of his earlier position when he told the House that a European army meant "duplication, confusion and divided responsibility."

whole project and it was obvious at the end of 1950 that the European army was little more than a skeleton which demanded hard work and hard thinking if it were ever to develop into a flesh and blood creation.

As a first step in that direction the French government decided to call a conference to meet in Paris on February 15, 1951. When the Labor government announced it would send observers only, Eden pleaded for full participation on the grounds that "here is a unique opportunity for which we may never forgive ourselves if we miss it."⁵¹ In blunter terms Churchill cried out: "I say to the Prime Minister—beware how you continue this half-hearted policy."⁵² Attlee remained unmoved and England sent observers.⁵³ Participating as full members in the February meeting were France, Italy, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg—and when The Netherlands subsequently changed its observer status to full membership the Defense Community assumed the same composition as the Coal and Steel Authority. The atmosphere was hardly encouraging: Washington and London remained skeptical, Bonn demanded an equality which France was unwilling to admit on a practical plane, Belgium was restive, and military experts dubious of the efficacy of a multilingual fighting force.

The Conference began its work by considering a memorandum sent to it by the Council of Europe. This plan envisaged the creation of the European army in two stages. In the first phase all contributions by European countries to NATO should be grouped into a European army under a European Commander operating through an integrated staff. The Defense Ministers from the participating states would make up the Council. The second stage envisioned the creation of a Political Assembly, a European Minister of Defense and other permanent institutions for the control of the army.

As outlined by the French, however, there was to be formed within eighteen months a European army of ten to twelve divisions, including 100,000 Germans. In line with French insistence that integration must take place at the lowest possible level

⁵¹ House of Commons, *Debates*, vol. 484, c. 49.

⁵² *Ibid.*, c. 633.

⁵³ Canada, Denmark, the United States, Norway, Portugal and The Netherlands also sent observers.

the largest unit composed of any one nationality would be a combat team of 5,000 men, roughly a third the size of a normal division, and each division would have a minimum of two nationalities. Ideally, the French preferred an arrangement which would place French, German and Italian companies in the same battalion. Against this view the Germans posed in the Petersberg Plan an argument for national divisions of 15,000 men supported by artillery and able to fight against a comparable Russian division. The task of reconciling the two views was patently not going to be easy and American influence on more than one occasion was used to bring the recalcitrants into line.

The parleys, carried on mainly through a specially created Executive Committee, ran from February to July and while military experts haggled over details of *groupements*, logistics and equipment another bombshell was exploded across the Channel by Aneurin Bevan. On April 23, 1951 "Nye" Bevan arose in the House of Commons to explain his dramatic resignation from the Labor government.⁵⁴ His attack was not against the European army but against the whole concept of rearmament and in his reasoning precipitate American action was as much a danger to the peace as the Soviet threat; furthermore, it was fantastic for England to attempt to finance a £4,700 million arms program. The *Daily Herald* fulminated against Bevan as the self-appointed "idol of the wishful thinkers who look upon Socialism . . . as a device for getting everything for nothing",⁵⁵ and *The Economist* soberly assessed Bevanism as a "strange meteor in a dull summer sky. It has almost burned out now"—but not before the meteor had caused a straining of necks and eyes across the Channel. That Bevan's argument had impact in France may be seen in the ap-

⁵⁴ House of Commons, *Debates*, vol. 478, cc. 35-37. To popularize his views Bevan contributed two pamphlets, *One Way Only* and *Going Our Way*, and a recent book, *In Place of Fear* (London, 1952). For a temperate criticism of Bevan's views on finance and the army see the Report of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Defence in the Cold War*, pp. 95 et seq.

⁵⁵ *Daily Herald*, April 24, 1951. Bevan was clearly out of step with his party. At the T.U.C. Conference in 1950 the unions had approved by a thirteen to one majority the General Council's Report dealing, among other things, with rearmament. See the *Second Report of the 82nd Annual Conference of the T.U.C.*, 1950, pp. 425, 576-584.

⁵⁶ *The Economist*, September 22, 1951.

peal which Jules Moch, as Defense Minister and as a Socialist, made to his own Party Congress in May: "Everything is not possible", he cried, and the Socialists must have the courage to make the choice between "rearmament and social services".⁵⁷ His answer was failure to secure reëlection to the National Executive Committee of the party. At the same time General de Gaulle told an audience of 40,000 at Toulouse that the European Defense Organization was a project for a "stateless army which is nothing but a wild chimera".⁵⁸ Even the Consultative Assembly, which had reconvened in May, was caught in the paralysis; in the midst of discussions on defense M. Pezet of France moved closure because of the "futility of this debate".⁵⁹ Indeed, the only constructive result of the spring session at Strasbourg was a recommendation which urged the admission of Greece and Turkey into the Atlantic Defense; yet even the value of this contribution was shattered by the projection of partisan strife by the Labor group which attempted, unfairly, to fasten the "third force" label on the Conservatives.⁶⁰

IV. *The July Interim Report*

In view of the discouraging elements which characterized the whole defense picture in the spring of 1951, it came as a rather pleasant surprise when the five members of the European Defense Group finally approved an Interim Report the details of which were released on July 24 by M. Alphand, head of the French delegation and chairman of the conference.⁶¹ The area of agreement included acceptance of the *principle* of equality among all participants in the organization, the fusion of armed forces under a supranational authority, and the financing of the integrated forces from a common fund. Furthermore, it affirmed that the proposed European army would be at the disposition of the Atlantic Command, and that during the transitional period the European defense institutions would exist but would delegate responsibility to national authorities. In organization the Community mirrored the Schuman Plan: it was to have a European Defense Authority (either a single Commis-

⁵⁷ *The Times* of London, May 14-15, 1951.

⁵⁸ *Le Monde*, May 6, 1951.

⁵⁹ *C. A. Reports*, 1951, p. 354.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 343.

⁶¹ The text of the communiqué may be found in *Le Monde*, July 26, 1951.

sioner or Board of Commissioners), a Council of Ministers, a Parliamentary Assembly and a Court of Justice. As far as principle was concerned—and actually the Report represented agreement in principle rather than the agreement in detail which it claimed to achieve—the most important aspect was the acceptance of the idea of a supranational authority. This meant that in actual application the Churchill Resolution was clearly intended to subserve French needs and desires. Still unanswered were questions concerning the level at which integration could be effected, the amount each country should contribute to the common fund, and the precise nature the Defense Authority should assume. Above all, it was evident that no clear compromise had been worked out to reconcile Germany's demand for practical equality and France's fear of a revived *Wehrmacht*.

Despite these lacunae the Interim Report aroused considerable optimism since it seemed to prove what many observers tended to question, namely, the willingness and ability of European nations to pool their defense forces. On September 14, 1951 the Foreign Ministers of France, England and the United States, meeting in Washington, issued a communiqué announcing their intent to establish a new contractual relationship with Western Germany and welcoming the "Paris plan as a very important contribution to the effective defense of Europe, including Germany." However, the benediction was not enough to exorcise the evil spirits which influential segments of French public opinion continued to see in the scheme. As a matter of fact the De Gaullists intensified their opposition⁶² and even Jules Moch expressed the fear that the Pleven Plan had degenerated into a camouflage for a revived *Wehrmacht*—a view shared by M. Ramadier and others high in the S.F.I.O. councils.⁶³ On the eve of Schuman Plan debates in the French National Assembly, the MRP delegates declared that its vote for the Coal and Steel Community did not imply support for the European Defense Community "about which they had grave doubts".⁶⁴ In Germany Dr. Schumacher challenged the legal right of Chancellor

⁶² *Le Monde*, November 29, 1951.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, December 4, 1951.

⁶⁴ *The Times* of London, December 6, 1951.

Adenauer to accept the Western offer while Herr Grotewohl clamored for all-German elections.

The one bright ray of encouragement was the fact that in October 1951 the Conservatives had squeaked back to power in England and it was hoped that as sponsor of the Strasbourg recommendation Churchill would bring his party and his government into more active support for the European army. These aspirations were summarily dashed by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe who told the Consultative Assembly on November 28 that England could never participate in a Defense Community built on federalist principles. In words strongly reminiscent of those used by Ernest Davies on November 13 of the previous year, Sir David warned against "anything that would lead to confusion and unnecessary duplication".⁶⁵ Paul Reynaud expressed the continentalists' profound indignation when he declared that Sir David's position was a "direct repudiation of the stirring motion as worded by the present leader of the British Government and adopted at his request in this Assembly by a huge majority."⁶⁶ He warned that British abstention from a continental force would kill hopes of it ever being approved by the French Parliament: "It would be, I fear, the end of Europe." France and England seemed astonished at the other's action and in a real sense both camps had a measure of reason on their side. The Conservatives had never once intimated that they would actually join a supranational authority and resented what they felt was a misrepresentation of their position. On the other hand, the French had never made any attempt to conceal their interpretation of the Churchill motion as a supranational project and felt incensed that Churchill, the Prime Minister, was unwilling to support Churchill, the parliamentarian.

⁶⁵ C. A. Reports, 1951, p. 514. See also *Le Monde*, November 29, 1951.

⁶⁶ C. A. Reports, 1951, p. 519. When *The Times* of London, on the 29th of November, ventured an editorial opinion that the Churchill motion had little in common with the "far-reaching plan since prepared in Paris," Reynaud fired an epistolary blast at *The Times* (December 4, 1951) in which he charged that the Paris conferees merely implemented the inherent principles of Churchill's suggestion. The writer talked briefly to M. Reynaud in Strasbourg the very day his letter to *The Times* was published, and, although the French diplomat made no effort to hide bitter disappointment, he observed that the whole defense project had had difficult sledding and that perhaps, eventually, England could be persuaded to join.

V. Strasbourg, December 1951

The meeting of the NATO Council, which followed on the heels of a Paris conference between Adenauer and the three Foreign Ministers, had finished its work in Rome on November 28 by asking the six states of the potential European Defense Community to have a detailed report ready for the Lisbon Conference which was scheduled to meet in February 1952. The Prime Ministers of Belgium, Italy and Germany and France's Foreign Minister decided to meet in a special session at Strasbourg in early December to hammer out details. Since the Consultative Assembly was to convene at the same time, it appeared that here was a golden opportunity for it to assume a position of positive leadership in European affairs.

It was widely known that sharp differences of opinion existed among the Ministers. Before leaving Rome M. Schuman had told a press conference that a "supranational army implies a supranational political authority" but the Low Countries remained unconvinced on this point. In addition, Italy, France and Germany favored majority decisions in the Council of Ministers while the Benelux delegation advocated unanimity. Here were specific areas where Strasbourg might offer constructive suggestions. On December 10 the appearance of the four Ministers wrote a new page in the Assembly's history.⁶⁷ The speeches followed anticipated patterns. On the practical side Schuman and Adenauer reiterated support for majority voting in the Defense Authority on the grounds that unanimity meant a veto for each nation. M. van Zeeland argued the Belgium position persuasively against a heavy superstructure of the Schuman Plan variety and, while modifying his stand slightly on voting procedure, made it clear that in the Committee of Ministers vital decisions should be reached through unanimous consent. Had van Zeeland's position won support it is quite possible that British association with the European Community might have been more intimate.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ For the texts of the speeches by De Gasperi, van Zeeland, Schuman and Adenauer see *C. A. Reports, 1951*, pp. 988-1000, 1002-1010. Fairly good summaries were given in *The Times* of London, December 10, 1951.

⁶⁸ See particularly Mr. Amery's speech, *C. A. Reports, 1951*, pp. 1021-1025. The Benelux group was especially anxious not to lose contact with England. See the de-

If the Ministers expected to get a practical "lift" from the Assembly they were disappointed—yet no more keenly than the Assembly's president, Paul-Henri Spaak, whose discouragement led him to quit the chairmanship the last day of the sessions. He noted sadly that the Ministers came to seek help and "we gave none at all." Internal rifts between the federalists, the supranational functionalists and the protagonists of inviolable national sovereignties paralyzed its effectiveness. He was especially critical of Britain and declared bluntly that her constant appeals to Empire commitments struck him as a "pretext rather than any valid reason".⁶⁹ Yet within a fortnight Britain did assume a more positive approach by declaring that she would maintain troops on the continent and "would associate herself as closely as possible with the European Defense Community...."⁷⁰ Meanwhile, the Ministers, working more constructively late into the night of December 12, reached agreement on a working compromise which was further refined at a subsequent meeting in Paris on December 27. In January a six-Power Conference was able to wind up final details for the report which M. Schuman presented to the Atlantic Council in Lisbon.⁷¹

Now for the first time the fourteen members of the NATO Council were able to give official blessing to German rearmament within the Defense Community.⁷² Yet important bottlenecks still remained, largely as a result of French demands for special guarantees against Germany. On the eve of the Lisbon meeting the government of Edgar Faure had risked its existence by demanding support for its EDC policy from the French National Assembly. Faure smashed through to a substantial victory over the Communist and De Gaulist opposition by a vote of 327 to 287 but the general uneasiness with which the As-

bates in the Belgian House, Chambre des Representants, *Compte Rendu Analytique*, February 13, 1952, pp. 227 *et seq.*

⁶⁹ C. A. Reports, 1951, pp. 1110-1111.

⁷⁰ *The Times* of London, December 19, 1951. By early spring Schuman in a press interview had formulated the specific guarantee France would seek. *La Gazette de Lausanne*, April 29, 1952.

⁷¹ *The Times* of London, February 8 and 23, 1952.

⁷² The text of the Lisbon communiqué may be found in the *Bulletin of the Department of State*, vol. 26, pp. 367-368 (March 10, 1952).

sembly viewed German rearmament was reflected in the following four concessions it wrung from the government: (1) Germany would be blocked from full membership in NATO, (2) no German troops would be conscripted until all six nations had ratified the army plan, (3) national contingents would be integrated gradually into the European army, and (4) the United States must be asked to maintain troops in Europe as a guarantee against German withdrawal from EDC once she had armed units of her own.

France got her guarantees of American troops for Europe, and Germany (as a result of previous compromise worked out in London between Adenauer and the Foreign Ministers of England, France and the United States) was held to something less than full membership in NATO.⁷³ This created a practical difficulty in that Germany was required to surrender control over her armed forces and much of her defense appropriations to a supranational European Defense Community—something not required of NATO members. To correct this unbalance it was agreed at Lisbon that mutual guarantees and the closest possible liaison would be created between the two organizations.⁷⁴

The net result of Lisbon, therefore, was to clear the tracks for the actual signing in May of the EDC treaty, a bulky document of some two hundred pages which reflected a large assortment of compromises.⁷⁵

As finally approved the treaty accepted the principle of equality for all member states, stressed its defensive and supranational aspects and asserted the doctrine that an attack on one would constitute an attack against all. Common institutions, a common budget and common forces were calculated to give the Community the necessary degree of integration. Particularly interesting is the structure which, according to Article 8, is to

⁷³ Wilhelm W. Stütz, "Atlantikpact mit Vorbehalt", *Aussen Politik*, pp. 209-215 (April 1952).

⁷⁴ Details to effectuate the exchange of mutual guarantees were completed on May 6-7 at a Paris meeting of the NATO Council working under Lord Ismay. On May 13 the British government indicated officially its commitment for a close association with the EDC partners.

⁷⁵ The best summary of the draft treaty was carried in *Le Monde*, May 10, 1952; the full text of the signed treaty is available in *Chronique de politique étrangère* (Brussels), vol. 5, pp. 550-564 (September-November 1952).

consist of four major organs: a Commissariat, a Council of Ministers, an Assembly and a Court of Justice.

(1) The *Commissariat* is the supranational executive body and consists of nine members elected for six-year terms according to a schedule resembling that employed for the American Senate. Duties include the coördination of organizing, training and recruiting soldiers for the European army, the nomination of officers for basic national units after agreement with the government directly concerned, and the selection of superior officers after consultation with the Council of Ministers. The creation of a board rather than a defense commissioner represents a victory for the Italo-German view which felt that a single commissioner would invariably be a Frenchman.

(2) The *Council of Ministers*, reflecting national interests, exercises restraint over the Commissariat through its power to withhold approval on critical issues. A complicated voting procedure does not hide the fact that Belgium (which had consistently insisted on unanimity vote where vital decisions such as mobilization and allocation of moneys were concerned) had won its point.

(3) The *Assembly* is composed of the same delegates who constitute the deliberative body of the Coal and Steel Authority and has roughly the same functions. At its annual session the Assembly is to debate reports submitted in advance by the Commissariat and may make recommendations when so minded. Its most important immediate strength rests in the power to remove the Commissariat through a two-thirds vote of censure (Art. 36) but there is hope in some quarters that Article 38 will make the Assembly the truly creative organization within the Community. This provision empowers that body to explore possibilities for the creation of a federal or confederal Europe and to examine prospects for erecting a bicameral parliament which would have real legislative powers. It should be remarked, therefore, that the existing Assembly is largely a stop-gap, that its work is provisional in nature, and that it represents a compromise between those who would use the army to achieve full European Union and those who would hold to the present line of advance; it is a compromise which leaves unresolved the critical problem of over-all authority.

(4) The *Court of Justice* (Articles 51-67), imitating the Assembly organization, utilizes the personnel of the Coal-Steel judiciary and is empowered to determine all legal disputes arising under the treaty.

The military provisions are highly technical but to the layman the important fact is that the Defense Community anticipates the creation of forty-three *groupements* (each composed of some 13,000 men) and that Germany is expected to contribute twelve such divisions. The basic unit of the European army would be a corps of 80,000 soldiers while the largest national unit in the air branch would be 75 planes. Naval forces are also included within the Community and all services operate under integrated commands.

VI. *Retrospects and Prospects*

The twenty-one-month interval between the launching of the European army project at Strasbourg and the actual treaty signing in Paris reveals very definite trends which permit some minor prophesies. For one thing it should be recalled that the idea was launched at a time when Europe had been galvanized to action by the Korean War and whether that necessary sense of urgency can be maintained to assure the project's success is highly problematic. Another point for concern is the fact that the Defense Community has been built mainly through the efforts of Adenauer, De Gasperi and Schuman and the loss of power by any one of them could destroy the beautiful equilateral triangle upon which the prestige and influence of the EDC so largely repose. Furthermore, the persistent efforts to link the EDC with a European political union may seem logical but the identification of an immediate with a long-range prospect invites further delays in ratification. Finally, will the announced advances made in the use of thermo-nuclear weapons engender the conviction that land armies are obsolete and that the "push-button" war has finally arrived?

Above all, the climate of public opinion in both France and Germany has tended to become increasingly volatile. Will the French National Assembly, which has repeatedly demonstrated its nervousness at the prospect of German rearmament, have the courage and ability to go all the way toward ratification and wholehearted support? Or will Frenchmen feel that the Pleven

Plan has been perverted by compromise?⁷⁶ Will the tensions in Africa and the drain on her resources in Indo-China frighten France into demands for greater concessions?⁷⁷

The situation in Germany is no less confused. By raising the question of the legal compatibility of the Defense pact with the Bonn Basic Law the Social Democrats have placed Chancellor Adenauer in an awkward position and his attempts to secure an early and favorable decision from the German courts have turned considerable public opinion against the government. In addition, the Free Democrats on whom the Adenauer coalition relies for support have moved steadily toward a reactionary and nationalistic program, and the liberal leader of the party, Dr. Blücher, has been forced to give ground before the onslaughts of Dr. Middlehauve and his bloc—so much, in fact, that it is feared the party may fall captive to the neo-Nazi elements within its ranks.⁷⁸ At the other extreme is a small group of pacifists who oppose any form of remilitarization and integration with the West; under the leadership of Dr. Heinemann, Frau Wessel and Herr Bodensteiner, the last an ex-cabinet member, they have rallied to form a new party, *Gesamtdeutsche Volkspartei*, which reflects the growing support for the thesis that Germany's best chance for peace is to remain unarmed and neutral.⁷⁹ If the Soviets should make further concessions in a dramatic move to persuade Germany that by abandoning the Defense Community she could win for herself both political unity and economic freedom, would there be sufficient will to resist such tempting bait?⁸⁰

⁷⁶ It is significant that Pleven himself recently emphasized the divergences between his original proposal and the signed treaty although he continued to express the conviction that France should ratify the treaty. *Le Figaro*, November 25, 1952.

⁷⁷ In this connection it is interesting to note that the French have concentrated their ire on Articles 13 and 107 especially of the treaty since both seem to hamper France's overseas efforts. *Le Figaro*, November 28, 1952.

⁷⁸ *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, November 25, 1952.

⁷⁹ For an example of this reasoning see F. Baade, "Wie kann Deutschland verteildt werden", *Aussen Politik*, pp. 254-263 (July 1951). Nor should one neglect Walter Lippmann's pioneer study, *The Cold War: A Study in U. S. Policy* (New York, 1948). Compare these views with C. G. D. Onslow, "West German Re-armament", *World Politics*, vol. 3, pp. 450-485 (July 1951).

⁸⁰ The Soviet note of March 10, 1952 which incorporated the bases for such a solution represented a startling reversal of Russian policy and a repudiation of the

Let us go one step further to assume that the treaty has won substantial majorities for ratification in every member state. What, then, are the prospects? A brief catalogue of queries provides the best answer. Will an EDC structure which requires unanimous approval by the Ministers before certain vital decisions are reached prove too cumbersome for the rapid and effective action which crisis demands? Will forty-three *groupements* fight effectively under the untried symbol of "Western Europe" against comparable Russian divisions fighting under the proved symbolism of a national emblem? Will European patriotism survive the inevitable mistakes of war or will Germans blame French and the French blame Germans for every breach in the common defenses? Are there enough bilingual or trilingual officers available to transmit orders clearly and effectively? Will a national division obey an order to abandon the homeland for defensive positions in another country even when the order is tactically sound?⁸¹

The bark that is the European Defense Community looks tragically frail for the turbulent seas it must sail and it requires no small courage for individual nations to trust their destinies to it. No one dares predict its eventual destination, but it is clear that its tortured journey up to this point reflects all the fundamental tensions and fears which haunt post-war Europe.

CLARENCE C. WALTON

UNIVERSITY OF SCRANTON

Prague proposals which had guided her earlier approaches. The text of the note may be found in *Etudes Soviétiques*, No. 48, pp. 89-91, and in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (March 29, 1952). A London *Times* correspondent reported on May 10, 1952 that he found considerably "less unqualified support for the raising of a new army than for renewal of discussions with the Russians." See also Joseph Rovan, "L'opinion allemande et la rémilitarisation", *Politique étrangère*, vol. 16, pp. 59-74 (January-February 1951).

⁸¹ On some of the technical problems confronting a European army see Colonel Achard-James, "Défense de l'Europe", *Revue de défense nationale*, vol. 12, pp. 280-291 (May 1951); and the two articles by Brian Tunstall, "The Military Power of Western Union", and "Some Broader Aspects of Western Strategy", *World Affairs*, vol. 3, pp. 546-557 (October 1949), and vol. 4, pp. 181-195 (April 1950). Helpful, too, are the books by B. H. Liddell Hart, *Defense of the West* (New York, 1950), and Adelbert Weinstein, *Armee ohne Pathos* (Bonn, 1951).